INTRODUCTION
PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL CHOICE frequently take the following form. There are n voters and a set K = {1, 2,..., k} of objects. These objects may be bills considered for adoption by a legislature, candidates considered for membership in a club, etc. The voters must choose (adopt) a subset of the set of objects. Assume that each voter has a linear order of the 2k possible subsets that can be adopted. A voting scheme is a method for passing from n-tuples of these linear orders, called preference profiles, to sets of objects. A scheme is dictatorial if there is some voter whose preferred choice is always selected, no matter what the preferences of other voters. A scheme is manipulable if, for some profile of individual preferences, a voter can obtain an outcome set that he prefers by misrepresenting his true preferences. Applied to this framework, the GibbardSatterthwaite theorem says that if there is more than one issue to consider for adoption, then all nonmanipulable schemes are dictatorial.2 (An additional hypothesis is required: the range of the scheme must contain at least three sets of objects.)
In this paper we provide a response to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that is of the same form as the one provided by Groves and Clarke in their classic papers on the free-rider problem. For social choice problems in which the interpretation of an outcome is a public decision and a vector of money transfers, and preferences are of the transferable utility form, the Groves-Clarke mechanisms are nonmanipulable. Furthermore, they are the only nonmanipulable mechanisms on the domain of transferable utility preferences. Here we prove parallel results for the problem of selecting subsets from a set K of objects. We define a class of mechanisms called voting by committees and observe that on an important domain of preferences they are nonmanipulable. We then establish that voting by committees is the only form of nonmanipulable scheme on this domain. A familiar special case of voting by committees is voting by quota. In the quota system with quota Q((1 < Q < n), the ith voter (1 < i < n) votes a subset of the objects Ai c K and the outcome is the set of objects that belong to at least Q of the sets Ai. This type of voting is used explicitly by some clubs when electing new members: a candidate for membership is elected if his name is checked on some predetermined number (say Q) of ballots. A reduced form of voting by quota operates in many legislative bodies. Elected representatives normally vote on a large number of issues each year. Although the issues are in practice confronted one by one, with, for example, support by two-thirds of the legislators needed for adoption, it is as if all legislators announce at once the issues they support (this might follow some logrolling) and as if issues announced by two-thirds of the legislators are then adopted.
Voting by quota is a particular way of describing which coalitions of voters are winning, in the sense that they can force an object into the final outcome set. A more general class of voting scheme can be described by specifying a family of winning coalitions for each object and then including an object into the outcome set if and only if the set of voters who favor it constitutes a winning coalition. (We assume that if a coalition is winning, then so are its supersets.) This device of specifying voters and winning coalitions is standard in game theory and is known as a (monotonic) simple game, or a committee. Thus, the voting scheme just described, which uses a committee to choose each object, is called voting by committees. The key result of this paper is a characterization of voting by committees. 3 We now specify the domain of preferences that will be considered. For a preference relation defined on the subsets of K, we will call an object "good" if it is preferred to the empty set. A preference relation is separable if for any set A cK, and any object x 9 A, {x} UA is preferred to A if and only if x is good. As a special case, preferences are separable when they have an additive representation.4 Since separability requires a degree of independence among objects, interaction effects lead to its failure. A conservative legislator may favor the passage of either of two laws by itself ({x} > 0, and {y} > 0); the adoption of two together might, in his opinion, represent an intolerable change from the 3There is some similarity between voting by committees and approval voting, a method that has been studied in detail by Brams and Fishburn (1982) . They are similar in that in both methods voters submit a set of objects. However, they are different in virtually every other respect, since the social choice in approval voting is a single object and since approval voting is in general manipulable (after one introduces a tie-breaker rule so that it is well-defined).
4A preference relation > on 2K is additively representable if there exists a function U: status quo (0 > {x, y}). Therefore, his preference relation is not separable. If you believe that the appointment of Professor Glutz or Professor Smith would be preferred to nobody being appointed, but you believe that appointing both of them together would be a disaster since it would tear your institute apart, then your preferences are not separable. It is easy to see that voting by committees is not manipulable on the domain of separable preferences.5 To see this, fix a profile of preferences and let S denote the set of objects that will be included in the outcome set independently of how the ith voter votes. If voter i has a separable preference relation, then his most preferred subset is his set of good objects, and he would like to add as many of them to S as possible. By truthfully reporting his preferred subset under voting by committees, i adds to S all the objects that he considers good among those he can add. With separable preference this is the best he can do. In addition to nonmanipulability over separable preferences, voting by committees satisfies the classical property of voter sovereignty: no subset of objects is a priori barred from emerging as the outcome.
We can now be more specific about our characterization of voting by committees. It is the only method for passing from n-tuples of individual preferences to sets of objects that satisfies voter sovereignty and nonmanipulability on the domain of separable preferences.
Voting by quota is then easily characterized as the subclass of voting by committee methods that satisfies the additional classical requirements of anonymity and neutrality. Anonymity guarantees the symmetric treatment of individuals, and it formalizes the requirement of "one man one vote." Neutrality means that each object is given a free hand to emerge and that one object is not favored over another simply because of its "name." Under voting by quota, winning coalitions are determined by size only, not by the names of the voters, and the same committee is used for all objects.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce notation, definitions, and the main theorems. Then in Section 3 we prove that voting by committees is manipulable on any domain larger than that of separable preferences. Finally, in Section 4 we study the efficiency property of voting by committees.
A CHARACTERIZATION OF VOTING BY COMMITTEES

Notation and the Statements of the Main Theorems
The set of voters is N = {1, 2, ... , n}. The set of objects is K = {1, 2,..., k}. We assume that n and k are at least 2.6 Subsets of K are denoted by 5Notice that with separable preferences all triples of sets of objects are free. Thus, there does not exist a social welfare function on this domain that satisfies Arrow's axioms. This should be a warning against misinterpretations of results by Satterthwaite (1975), Kalai and Muller (1979) , and others, regarding the close connection between the possibilities of defining Arrowian social welfare functions and strategy-proof decision schemes on a domain. 6 Our main results can also cover the cases n = 1 or k = 1. We exclude these trivial cases for ease of exposition since including them would require minor changes in some of our statements. We consider voting schemes that have each voter order the 2k subsets of objects and for each n-tuple of such orderings produce an outcome of a set of objects. Formally, we have the following definition. 
=A.
Of course, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, voting by committees is manipulable on pn. We are interested in the restricted domains on which voting by committees becomes strategy-proof. One such restriction is introduced in the following manner. A voter can evaluate each object separately from the other objects. For each > E P, let G(>) = {x E KJ {x} > 0) be called the set of good objects, and its complement GC(>) the set of bad objects. Notice that additive representability implies separability (see footnote 3 for the definition of additive representability). The converse is not true with more than two objects. For example, the preference relation >: {x, y, z} > {x, y} > {x, z} > {y, z} > {z} > {y} > {x} > 0 is separable but not additively representable. Also notice that whenever > is separable, B(>) = G(>): the best set is the set of all good objects.
It is easy to check that voting by committees is strategy-proof on (pS)n and satisfies voter sovereignty. More importantly, our main theorem states that voting by committees is the only method to have these two properties. Next we specialize our result to anonymous and neutral voting schemes. The last remark we want to make is that Theorem 1 and its corollary still hold when the domain of separable preferences is replaced by that of additively representable preferences.8 THEOREM 2: A voting scheme f: (pA)n -* 2K is strategy-proof on (pA)n and satisfies voter sovereignty if and only if it is voting by committees.
COROLLARY 2: A voting scheme f: (pA)n -* 2K satisfies anonymity, neutrality, voter sovereignty, and is strategy-proof on (pA)n if and only if it is voting by quota.
Proofs of the Theorems
As mentioned above, voting by committees, although formally defined on preference n-tuples, does not require complete specifications of voters' preference relations. If f is voting by committees, then it depends only on the voters' most preferred sets. We call this property "tops only," and use the following notation:
We first characterize all strategy-proof voting schemes in this restricted subclass. The distinct feature of this characterization is that it does not require any condition other than strategy-proofness. Notice that in general a strategyproof voting scheme can be such that some object is never elected, or some other always elected. To allow for these possibilities, we extend slightly our 8Although pA is a subset of ps, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 are logically independent. previous notion of a committee, admitting an empty set of winning coalitions or the empty coalition of voters as a winning coalition. x E St! </* x E Si, and x E f(S'). Again, when one replaces Si by Sit one by one to go from S to S', successive applications of (i) and (ii) lead to x Ecf(S).
Q.E.D.
The limitation of Lemma 1 is that the voting schemes considered are assumed a priori to have the property of "tops only." The example after Theorem 1 illustrates that "tops only" is not a consequence of strategy-proofness. However, if voter sovereignty is assumed, then we can show that strategy-proofness implies "tops only." In fact, even a weaker condition than voter sovereignty suffices. To motivate this condition, let us have a closer look at the structure of voting by generalized committees. An object for which the generalized committee has an empty collection of winning coalitions will never appear in any outcome, while an object for which the generalized committee contains even the empty coalition as a winning coalition will appear in all outcomes. Furthermore, if one examines the class of objects that appear in some outcomes but not all, then any subset of this class, union the set of objects that are always chosen, will occur as an outcome. This property is called weak voter sovereignty. Sometimes it is simply written as o-_i(>i) when it is clear which f is being discussed. PROOF OF LEMMA 2: It is easy to check that voting by generalized committees is strategy-proof on (pS)n and satisfies weak voter sovereignty. To prove the converse, we proceed by induction.
Step 1: We begin with the case in which there are two voters. The following facts are direct consequences of the assumption that f is strategy-proof and satisfies voter sovereignty. (v) Given (iv), we can apply Lemma 1 to conclude that f is voting by generalized committees. And the structures of these generalized committees are obvious.
Step 2: We assume that the theorem is true for all cases with less than n voters. Now we consider a voting scheme f from ( 
SEPARABLE PREFERENCES AND THE STRATEGY-PROOFNESS OF VOTING BY COMMITTEES
We already know that voting by committees is the only method that satisfies strategy-proofness and voter sovereignty on the domain of separable preferences. In this section we will show that, in general, voting by committees cannot be strategy-proof on any larger domain. To make this idea precise, we restrict attention to admissible domains that admit a wide enough variety of preferences. If voting by committees is strategy-proof on a rich domain R, then what does this tell about the structure of R? Not much can be deduced if the power structures of the committees are extreme. Consider the example of voting by a single committee C. When C is dictatorial, voting by committee C is strategyproof on the universal domain, and there is no restriction at all on the admissible preferences. Dictatorship is an example of one of the cases we consider extreme: some voter can single-handedly prevent other voters from forming a winning coalition. The other extreme is when some voter never contributes to any winning coalition: for any winning coalition he belongs to, some voters within it-excluding him-can form a winning coalition on their own. We now present a condition that is used to eliminate such situations. Efficiency obviously implies voter sovereignty; therefore, by Theorem 1, any voting scheme that is efficient and strategy-proof must be voting by committees. Furthermore, we can show that voting by committees 1s generally not efficient unless it is dictatorial. As an introductory example, we consider a situation where K = {x, y}, N = {1, 2}, and the voting scheme is voting by quota Q = 1. Voter 1 prefers x to the empty set, but dislikes y so much that even x and y together are worse than the empty set; and voter 2 prefers y to the empty set, but dislikes x so much that x and y together are also worse than the empty set. Voting by quota Q = 1 produces the outcome {xy}, which is Pareto dominated by 0. The second example is: K = {x, y), N = {1, 2, 3}, and the voting scheme is voting by quota Q = 2. In this case the voting scheme turns out to be efficient. However, the second example represents a rare case. It occurs only when k = 2 and the committees in the voting schemes have some special structures.12 The negative result prevails when k > 3.
PROOF OF THEOREM
4: We will provide a proof for the case in which K contains three distinct objects only: x, y, and z. The proof for the general case is similar. We show that the existence of such a voting scheme leads to a contradiction. Suppose f is a voting scheme that is efficient, strategy-proof, and nondictatorial on (pS)n. By Theorem 1, we know that f must be voting by committees. Let Cx, Cy, and CZ be the corresponding committees for x, y, and z. (ii) If N1 is not winning for one object, say x, then N2 must be winning for any other object, say y. Otherwise, let >1 and >2 in ps be the following: {x} >1{xy} >10 >1{y} >1., and {YI >2{XYI >20 >2{x} >2 ....
For the preference profile in which every voter in N1 has >1 and everyone in N2 has >21 f produces the outcome 0, which is Pareto dominated by {xy}. Similarly, if N = N1 U N2 U N3 (Ni's are exclusive), then: (iii) It cannot be true that N1 is not winning for x, N2 not winning for y, and N3 not winning for z.
We now define rx =min{#MIM is winning in CXj. ry and rz are defined similarly. Finally, let r = min {rx, ry, rz}.
(1) Suppose r = 1. Without loss of generality, we assume that voter 1 is winning for x. According to (i), N\ {1} is not winning for y or z. Then, according to (ii), voter 1 is winning for both z and y. Again, according to (i), N\ {1} is not winning for x. But now voter 1 is a dictator. This is a contradiction.
(2) Suppose 2 < r < n. Assume M is winning for x and #M = r. According to (i), N\M cannot be winning for z. Since #M = r > 2, we can divide M into two disjoint nonempty coalitions: M = M1 U M2. By the definition of r, M1 is not winning for x and M2 not winning for y. Together with the fact that N\M is not winning for z, we have a contradiction to (iii). 
